Introduction
The case fatality rate is``a measure of disease severity and is defined as the proportion of patients with a specified disease or condition who die within a specified time'' (1) or``as the percentage of the number of persons diagnosed as having a specific disease who die as a result of that illness. This term is most frequently applied to a specific outbreak of acute disease in which all patients have been followed for an adequate period of time to include all attributable deaths'' (2) . Though these definitions acknowledge that case-fatality rate is not independent of time of observation, by using a qualification such as``within a specific time'' or``adequate period of time,'' the rate has been treated as constant in most textbooks and in the modeling of epidemics.
A series of my work (3) (4) (5) (6) , however, has shown that for some epidemics, the case-fatality rate thus defined changes over time. This article briefly summarizes my previous work on this topic and further explores how different factors affect the dynamics of the case-fatality rate.
Review of previous observations
In March 2009, the novel influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic was first reported in Mexico and in the southwestern part of the USA. Figure 1 shows the time course of cumulative number (expressed in logarithm) of patients ( Fig. 1A) and that of the cumulative number of deaths (Fig. 1B ) from the epidemics in Mexico, the USA, and Argentina (data source: http:// idsc.nih.go.jp/disease/swine_influenza/wcases01.html [in Japanese]). The curves of cumulative numbers of patients in Mexico and in the USA were almost overlapping in the first 20 days (from April 30 to May 22), and then the curve for the USA continued to rise while that of Mexico faltered. In Argentina, the number of patients started to increase with a lag of ¿30 days with kinetics similar to those of the USA. The cumulative number of deaths in Mexico increased in parallel with the increase in the number of patients, while in the USA and Argentina the kinetics more closely represented an exponential increase.
In Fig. 2A , the plots in Figs. 2A and 2B were combined by eliminating the common parameter of time to make log-log plots. The plots followed the equation logY ＝ klogX -klogN 0 , where k is a constant deter- mining the slope, and N 0 is the value of X when Y ＝ 1 or the cumulative number of patients when the first death appeared. The slope of the plot for Mexico was º459(k ＝ 0.65) and that of Argentina and the USA was À459(k ＝ 2.8 for Argentina and ¿1.8 for the USA) (3). In appearance, the case-fatality rate continuously decreased in Mexico and continuously increased in Argentina and in the USA. Figure 2B shows the same plot in the normal scale. The curves for Argentina and the USA were concave, while that for Mexico was convex (note that these plots cannot be approximated properly by drawing regression lines crossing the origin of 1) : Initial rise with k ＝ 1 followed by the curve with k À 1.
2) : Initial long steep rise followed by less steep rise.
281 the coordinates). The curves can be expressed through transformation of logY ＝ klogX -klogN 0 , as Y ＝ X k /N 0 k . The case-fatality rate (CF) calculated for the period that elapses from the start of an epidemic to the point X ＝ X i , is expressed as CF(
, is obtained by differentiating Y with respect to X, i.e., CF(X
and CF(ªX i ) are both 1/N 0 . Figure 3 shows the similar log-log plots for total reported cases in the world of Ebola hemorrhagic fever from 1976 to 2003 (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ factsheets/fs103/en/index.html), that of avian influenza H5N1 from 2003 to 2010 (http://www.who.int/csr/ disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_05_ 13/en/), and that of the cholera epidemic in Haiti in 2010-2012 (http://new.paho.org/disaster/index.php? option＝com_content&task＝view&id＝1423&Itemid＝ 1). The plots of avian influenza H5N1 and Ebola hemorrhagic fever had slopes of 459(i.e., k ＝ 1) with N 0 ¿2, and overlapped each other, indicating that the two epidemics are similar in nature with high and constant case-fatality rates over time.
For the cholera epidemic in Haiti, the World Health Organization (WHO) website gives, in addition to number of deaths, number of cases from October 22 to 30, 2010, number of hospitalizations from November 3 to December 1, and the number of cases and number of hospitalized from December 6, 2010 to January 9, 2011. The plot of cases versus deaths (October 22 to 30) and hospitalized patients versus deaths (November 3 to December 1) were overlapping. From December 6 to January 9 of the next year, the plot of deaths versus cases shifted horizontally to the right, and that of deaths versus hospitalized curved slightly to the right. The shift that occurred from late November to early December in 2010 was probably brought about by improved care of patients through international aid. N 0 before the shift was ¿8, while it was 30 after the shift, which corresponds to reduction of the case-fatality rate from ¿13z to 3.3z, about a 4-fold reduction. Table 1 classifies the epidemics so far examined according to the slope of the log-log plot. While casefatality rate was constant or near constant in avian influenza H5N1, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, the 2010 cholera epidemic in Haiti, and hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) in China (5), this was clearly not so in the influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic (3, 5) and in some severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemics (6). i.e., when the human population consists of subpopulations with different susceptibilities or the pathogens consisting of subpopulations differing in virulence. Figure 4 shows the principle of tabulating such a hypothetical epidemic. The left-most column shows the time elapsed (the time interval from time t i to time t i＋1 is not necessarily constant in terms of physical time, as the speed of spread of a pathogen may not be constant during an epidemic). The second and the third columns, respectively, show cumulative numbers of patients and deaths in the normal population (NP). The fourth and fifth columns, respectively, show those in the vulnerable population (VP). The sixth and seventh columns, respectively, show those for the whole population, which were obtained by adding the respective numbers of NP and VP, i.e., X ＝ I (NP) ＋ I (VP) and Y ＝ D (NP) ＋ D (VP) .
In this model, populations NP and VP are characterized by three parameters: f, M, and D, with f representing the fraction of NP or VP in the total patient population when the first infected case appeared in VP; M being the multiplication factor of the number of patients from t i to t i＋1 ; and D representing the mortality rate. Thus, for example, a population expressed by Figure 5 shows model plots with k À 1 (Fig. 5A ) or k º 1 (Fig. 5B ) that were derived from two populations differing in M and D. The plots for the component populations, NP (squares) and VP (triangles), are represented by two lines with 459slope, and that of total population (NP ＋ VP) by the line (diamonds) in the middle.
As previously indicated (5) and as further discussed in this article, the situation with k À 1 (Fig. 5A) is best simulated by postulating a minor subpopulation, VP, where the infection spreads with a higher mortality rate and at a higher speed than in NP. The situation with k º 1 (Fig. 5B) is best simulated by postulating virus populations consisting of high virulence virus (HVV) and low virulence virus (LVV). LVV spreads in the community at a lower mortality rate and at higher speed than HVV (note that patients infected by a HVV become bedridden and present a reduced chance of further transmission). In the tabulation for k º 1 (Fig. 4) , a human population infected with a LVV is coded as NP and the population infected by HVV as VP.
4. Parameters affecting k and N 0 4-1. Cases with k À 1 A sharp rise after a long latent phase, i.e., k À 1 with large N 0 , as observed with the influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic in Argentina and the USA, means that the epidemic shifted from low case-fatality to increasingly high case-fatality at X ＝ N 0 .
In all the simulations with k À 1, D in VP was set significantly higher than in NP. Figure 6 shows the effect of the changes in f, M, and D on the shape of the curve. Figure 6A shows that a slope À459(i.e., k À 1) can be obtained only when both M and D are higher in VP than in NP. Increasing either M (triangles) or D (diamonds) in population VP alone thus does not result in k À 1 (compare squares with diamonds and triangles). Figure  6B examines the effect of the change in f. When f of VP becomes lower, the curve shifts to the right (compare squares and diamonds). Figure 6C Table 2 for the table used for the plot; Table 2a is for simulation of downward bent and Table 2b for that of upward bent. The vertical axis shows the cumulative number of the deaths and the horizontal axis that of the patients. 8  0  t4  16  0  0  0  16  0  t5  32  0  0  0  32  0  t6  64  0  0  0  64  0  t7  128  0  0  0  128  0  t8  256  0  0  0  256  0  t9  512  0  0  0  513  0  t10  1024  0  0  0  1028  0  t11  2048  0  0  0  2064  0  t12  4056  0  1  0  4057  0  t13  8112  1  4  1  8116  2  t14  16224  2  16  4  16240  6  t15  32448  4  64  16  32512  20  t16  64896  8  256  64  65152  72  t17  129792  16  512  128  130304  144  t18  259584  32  1024  256  260608  288  t19  519168  64  2048  512  521216  576 284 sion speed) rather than D (mortality) in VP affects the slope. Figure 6D Some epidemics were accompanied by upward bent (i.e., the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong) or a downward bent (i.e., the H1N1 2009 pandemic WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific) (crosses and squares, respectively; Fig. 7 ). The table used for simulating the upward or downward bent is shown in Table 2 . The upward bent was simulated by postulating that an epidemic started in a NP with a relatively high D and then began to involve the VP (diamonds in Fig. 7 ). The downward bent was simulated by postulating faltering of the transmission speed in VP on account of the population's gradual exhaustion (triangles in Fig. 7 ). The simulation completed by trials and errors for these types of plots was only partially satisfactory, however. The real situation may not be so simple. Table 2a is for simulation of curves with downward bent (i.e., H1N1 2009 pandemic in WPRO). At time t 16 , M of population VP is switched from 4 to 2 so as to reflect decreasing availability of population VP for transmission (D remains unchanged). Table 2b is for simulation of curves with upward bent (i.e., SARS in Hong Kong). Here, epidemic in population VP starts later than in population NP (t 10 in population VP contrast to t 1 in population NP) with higher mortality late (1/12 in population VP in contrast to 1/256 in population NP). 
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For SARS in Hong Kong and also in mainland China (6), the upward bent can be explained equally well by a scenario in which patients infected towards the end of the epidemic died after cessation of virus spread. It should be remembered, however, that this story does not fit the Singapore SARS epidemic where the log-log plot with k ＝ 3 lasted continuously for 2 months from beginning to end (March 27 to May 30).
4-2.
Cases with k º 1 k º 1 occurs when accumulation of deaths with high D lags behind the accumulation of patients. The situation is possible only when mortality rate (D) is higher and virus spread (M) is slower in VP than in NP. In addition, VP has to be sufficiently large so that the deaths in this group represent the deaths of the whole population. Therefore, in the following simulation f was set 1/2 or higher. Fig.  2A, also) .
Possible epidemic situations
For k À 1, there are two possible scenarios. One situation arises when the two populations are physically separated. This model fits well to settings such as hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities housing vulnerable populations where infection spreads easily at a high mortality rate (7).
However, the possibility that k À 1 occurs in mixed populations cannot be entirely excluded. In the mixed population, it is socially active patients in NP who transmit the pathogen to others. As k À 1 occurs at an advanced stage of an epidemic ( Fig. 2A) , even in the minor VP, the availability of the infection source will not be limiting. Suppose, for example: (i) establishment of infection needs two encounters for normal persons, while a vulnerable person needs only one, and (ii) uninfected persons encounter an infected person at an interval of 3 days. In this case, those belonging to a VP will acquire infection in only 3 days while those belonging to NP need 6 days. Such a scenario could result in a situation where infection spreads at higher speed and at higher mortality among the VP. However, this hypothesis needs confirmation by analytical and/or stochastic mathematical modeling.
For k º 1, the epidemic has to spread at lower speed and at higher mortality in VP than in NP. Let us first examine whether such a situation can be possible with two human subpopulations of different susceptibilities. If subpopulations NP and VP are mixed, the infected persons belonging to NP will mainly spread the virus (because bedridden patients in the VP have fewer opportunities for transmission), and they will do so equally well to persons in NP and VPs. In this situation, while the mortality (D) is higher in VP than in NP, the speed of transmission (M) will be the same for VP and NP. As demonstrated in Fig. 6A , the result is k ＝ 1. The slower spread with high mortality in VP is possible only when VP and NP are physically separated. However, no such situations have been reported from Mexico in the influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Let us then examine whether k º 1 can be possible when an epidemic is caused by cocirculation of two virus subpopulations, one HVV and the other LVV. While a LVV circulates rapidly with low mortality rate on one hand, the HVV will circulate slowly at a high mortality rate on the other. Such a situation is exactly the one obtained by the simulation shown in Fig. 8, where the NP is a human population infected by a LVV and the VP is a population infected by HVV.
What happened in Mexico in early 2009 and what happened in other countries thereafter?-A hypothesis
Most data so far published have suggested that the case-fatality rate of the novel influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic was rather low (8-11), which was confirmed by the present author by using the same method described in this paper (5) . The reported high mortality in the early epidemic in Mexico has been attributed to the possible low detection rate of the influenza patients (8, 9) . However, in my view, this claim is not substantiated by direct and/or quantitative data; it is mainly based on backward extrapolation of the later data to the early epidemic in Mexico and/or on some included episodes.
My log-log plot analysis using the raw data (3,4) indicated a different story, i.e., two influenza variants, one highly virulent and one low virulent ones, initiated the influenza 2009 H1N1 pandemic in Mexico, and the low virulence variant took over the epidemic by quickly spreading to the rest of the world. Arguments supporting this hypothesis are as follows. First, there was no anomaly in the data from Mexico. The kinetics of the increase of the cumulative number of cases in Mexico was exactly the same as that in the USA, at least during the first 3 weeks (Fig. 1A) , and the kinetics of increase of deaths went in parallel with that of infections, which is quite normal (Fig. 1B) . Even if half of the influenza cases in Mexico were not reported, the adjusted kinetics of the cumulative number of patients (Fig. 1A) , which shifts by log 2 upward, is almost the same as the original. Second, by transformation of the equation, k is expressed as k ＝ logY/log (X/N 0 ). The numerator logY (log of number of deaths) usually reflects the reality because death occurs more frequently in hospitals and the cause of most deaths is examined medically. The denominator log (X/N 0 ) changes little because both X and N 0 are equally affected by the surveillance sensitivity. Therefore, coefficient k is a relatively stable parameter. Third, it is very difficult to conceive that there was such a big difference in disease surveillance as claimed (8, 9) between Mexico and other countries in Central and South America. Fourth, though it may be argued that k º 1 is attributable to improved medical intervention made after the outbreak, this argument cannot be supported by the simulation in Fig. 6C or the data on the cholera epidemic in Haiti (Fig. 3) , which showed that a change in mortality rate (D) hardly affects the slope of the curve (k) and only shifts the plot horizontally.
Considering the intrinsic high mutability of the influenza virus, LVVs may easily arise through mutation from HVVs. LVVs will soon overwhelm HVVs on account of spreading transmission advantage and the capacity to immunize the population against the slowly spreading HVVs. The detection of multiple genetic groups among the 2009 H1N1 pandemic isolates (10) indicates the high mutability of the virus and its antigenic homogeneity (10) allows the less virulent strains to act as a natural live vaccine.
If this hypothesis is confirmed, a highly virulent strain should have been isolated already, but the isolates from 2009 H1N1 pandemic had no markers associated with high pathogenicity (12) . However, there are suggestive footprints of such isolates. The isolates from some severe cases had a D225G mutation that confers dual binding specificity enabling infection to the lower respiratory tract, and one particular plaque isolate had highly increased lethality to mice (13) . One of the first US isolates was characterized by increased replication and pathological changes in the lungs of nonhuman primates (14) . The high animal pathogenicity exhibited by these different isolates is compatible with a hypothesis that the originating virus had genetic trait conferring a high virulence. The hypothesis appears to be supported also by the early clinical accounts.``In contrast to seasonal influenza, most serious illnesses have occurred among children and non-elderly adults,'' and``approximately one quarter to one half who were hospitalized or died had no reported coexisting medical conditions'' (10). Reporting their experience in Mexico, DominguezCherit et al. noted that among 899 patients admitted for severe pneumonia, 58 were critically ill and 24 of them died within 60 days; the mean age was 44 years (15) . Similarly, Chowell et al. reported that among 2,155 patients with severe pneumonia, 821 were admitted and 100 among them died. Seventy-one percent of the severe pneumonia cases were patients 5-59 years old (16) . A similar observation was made by Perez-Padilla et al. (17) . (Fig. 8) . To obtain a more concrete picture of epidemics with different parameters, mathematical modeling is necessary. Whether k À 1 occurs in the mixed population or not needs such a treatment.
Epidemics can be largely divided into those with k ＝ 1 and those with k » 1. Ebola hemorrhagic fever, avian influenza H5N1, cholera, and HFMD belong to the former, and influenza H1N1 2009 pandemic and SARS belong to the latter. The first group includes infections with extremely high mortality, such as Ebola hemorrhagic fever and avian H5N1 influenza, which are less likely to cause a large outbreak, and fecal-oral infections, such as HFMD and cholera, which expose all the populations equally even though the mortality rate may differ among subpopulations (recall that k À 1 requires that both M and D are higher in the VP than in the NP). The second group, including the influenza H1N1 2009 pandemic and SARS, is characterized by airborne or droplet transmission requiring relatively close human contacts, high transmission rates, influence of host factors on severity, and probably the influence of local social structure on the transmission pattern.
What is the implication of the present study on the epidemic potential of avian influenza H5N1? My guess is that the situation could become very similar to the influenza H1N1 2009 pandemic, though it will cause more fatalities by infecting all age groups because there no immunity obtained by the past epidemics. So long as it remains in the avian community, H5N1 will remain a local fatal infection as Ebola hemorrhagic fever has. Once it gets into a human community, an epidemic will start with high mortality rate, as in Mexico in 2009, which will be followed by extremely rapid propagation of less virulent variants. However, if the community where the virus is first introduced allows easy virus transmission, such as a crowded impoverished community without sufficient medical care, selection for attenuated variants will be insufficient and strain(s) with relatively high virulence may be released into the outer world as epidemic strain(s).
Policy implications derived from the above analysis are the following. First, avian H5N1 introduced into human communities has to be detected and contained as quickly as possible. Second, once it starts to propagate, the chance of transmission should be reduced to the minimum so as to select against HVV. In these regards, the government of Mexico should be praised for the early detection of the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 and WHO for its due reaction, which has sometimes been criticized as overplay. Third, when a highly infectious but less virulent virus becomes the main epidemic strain (detected by high N 0 and k À 1), the target of hygienic and clinical measures can be shifted from the general public to VP, such as, hospitals, dispensaries, nursery schools, etc.
The influenza H1N1 2009 pandemic showed the utility of faithful documentation of the early epidemic and the importance of early virus isolation. The information thus obtained will be of immense value for assessing the risk of the next influenza pandemic, which could be more serious than the present H1N1 2009 pandemic.
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